胡彪;马俊;

• 1:天津理工大学管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

在废旧铅蓄电池逆向物流系统构建中，针对地方政府和生产商博弈关系的研究不多。为探究在EPR(生产者责任延伸)制度下地方政府和铅蓄电池生产商之间的关系，分别在静态和动态奖惩机制下构建了地方政府和铅蓄电池生产商演化博弈模型，研究政府监管对生产商实施EPR制度的影响。结果表明：在静态奖惩机制下，双方演化策略呈周期恶性循环，博弈系统处于极不稳定状态；在动态奖惩机制下，双方策略达到演化稳定状态，地方政府对生产商实施EPR起主导性作用。政府监管成本下降和政府奖惩力度增大，生产商实施EPR的意愿会增强；政府监管成本下降、政府奖惩力度减弱以及生产商实施EPR的难度系数增大，地方政府会更倾向于积极监管。

关键词(KeyWords)： 环境工程学;铅蓄电池;生产者责任延伸制度;演化博弈;系统动力学

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家重点研发计划课题(2019YFC1908302)

作者(Authors): 胡彪;马俊;

DOI: 10.13637/j.issn.1009-6094.2021.0327

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